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What lessons can be learnt from the ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis for the strategy 
and conduct of monetary policy? To analyse and debate this topic, more than eighty 
participants, chieﬂ  y from Europe and the United States, mostly professors of economics 
at prestigious universities or central bank economists, came together in Rome 
on 30 September and 1 October 2010. This conference was the fruit of collaboration 
between the Banque de France, the Banca d’Italia and its research institute, the 
Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance. It provided a forum for the presentation 
of a number of studies about the various aspects of this question, including the role 
of central banks in maintaining the smooth functioning of the interbank market, the 
effectiveness of the non-standard monetary policy measures adopted during the crisis, 
the interaction between monetary policy and macroprudential policy, and the role of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies during periods of “excessive” credit expansion.1
The conference lasted two days and included two presentations by prominent academics, 
the ﬁ  rst by Professor Michael Woodford from Columbia University in New York and the 
second by Professor Markus Brunnermeier from Princeton University in New Jersey. 
A number of research papers were presented by their authors and discussed by 
two selected experts before an open debate with the audience. The conference closed 
with a round table debate between Mario Draghi (Governor of the Banca d’Italia), 
Charles Evans (President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago), Christian Noyer 
(Governor of the Banque de France) and Athanasios Orphanides (Governor of the 
Central Bank of Cyprus) on “The future of monetary policy”.
This article summarises the main questions that dominated the presentations, 
discussions and debates, namely: are monetary policy and liquidity management 
always independent from each other? Should monetary policy preserve ﬁ  nancial 
stability? Should monetary policy react to asset price bubbles? And, more generally, 
what is the future for monetary policy?
Keywords: asset price bubbles, ﬁ nancial crisis, interbank market, macroprudential policy, monetary policy.
JEL codes: E3, E4, E5, E6, F4, G1, G2.
1  The conference’s programme and its papers may be consulted online at: http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/seminaires/the_future_
of_monetary_policy.htm.
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1|  Are monetary policy and liquidity management 
  always independent from each other?
The ﬁ  rst session of the conference, entitled “Monetary policy and liquidity”, 
focused on monetary policy implementation in a liquidity crisis context. 
Its primary objective was to highlight the operational challenges facing 
central banks in such situations and to examine the effectiveness of their 
available tools. The two articles in this session analysed the conduct of 
monetary policy in the euro area and in the United States respectively.
In their contribution, Achim Hauck and Ulrike Neyer (Heinrich Heine 
University, Dusseldorf) examine the implementation of the 
Eurosystem’s monetary policy during the crisis after the collapse of the 
investment bank Lehman Brothers. To that aim, the authors develop 
and use a model designed to reﬂ  ect the principal characteristics of 
an operational framework based on an interest rate corridor. In such 
operational frameworks, commercial banks can reﬁ  nance themselves 
either by obtaining liquidity directly on the interbank market or by 
borrowing from the central bank. In the latter case, they can either 
make permanent use of the central bank’s marginal lending and 
deposit facilities – but on less favourable terms than those offered 
by the market – or they can participate in the central bank’s weekly 
tender operations. The authors show that when interbank participation 
costs rise, the central bank’s intermediation increases. At the height 
of the crisis, participation costs – mainly reﬂ  ecting transaction and 
monitoring costs in situations where information on counterparty credit 
risk is imperfect – became prohibitive. This led to a near seizure of the 
interbank market, characterised notably by a sharp fall in transaction 
volumes and prompting the Eurosystem to stand in for this failing 
market. The authors also explain, in this context, why certain banks 
made such heavy use of the central bank deposit facility. In their view, 
any measures that might be taken by the Eurosystem to reactivate the 
interbank market which imply an increase in its funding costs may 
prove inconsistent with the desired monetary policy stance.
Xavier Freixas (Pompeu Fabra University), Antoine Martin and 
David Skeie (both at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) conducted 
a similar study focused on the reaction of the Federal Reserve System. 
Their analytical framework introduces an uncertainty about the 
distribution of liquidity desired by the banking system. The authors 
examine the optimal monetary policy response in this framework. 
They show that when banks are confronted with a shock that impacts 
the distribution of liquidity within the banking system engendering ARTICLES
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substantial liquidity differentials between them, the central bank should 
lower its target interest rates. This is precisely what happened in the 
United States and Europe. The objective of this easing is to prompt banks 
to lend to each other at reasonable rates and thereby relieve tensions 
in the interbank money market. Such action, however, implies that in 
a crisis situation, monetary policy can no longer be conducted without 
ﬁ  nancial stability considerations. The paper also shows that following 
an aggregate liquidity shock, the central bank should try to attenuate 
its impact by adjusting market liquidity. They therefore recommend 
that central banks should use two different instruments depending on 
the nature of the shock affecting the interbank market: interest rates 
in reaction to a shock affecting the distribution of liquidity within the 
banking system, and liquidity injections in response to generalised 
liquidity shocks. The authors therefore suggest that maintaining the 
separation principle in times of crisis – which recommends that central 
banks use interest rates exclusively to contain risks to price stability – 
would pose a risk to ﬁ  nancial stability by raising the likelihood of 
bankruptcies and hence of bank runs.
2|  Should monetary policy preserve 
ﬁ  nancial stability?
2|1  Sources of ﬁ  nancial instability
2|1|1  The risk-taking channel
One session focused on the analysis of the factors and mechanisms that 
tend to destabilise the supply of credit. Here, Luisa Lambertini (École 
polytechnique fédérale, Lausanne) presented a model explaining how 
excessive mortgage lending may arise. The primary objective of this study 
is quantitative. Can the magnitude of the recession experienced in 2008 
and 2009 be explained by a sudden change in lenders’ risk assessment and 
an increase in the proportion of borrowers likely to default? The model 
underscores the transmission mechanism via which borrowers’ defaults 
lead to a contraction of housing prices. The latter reduces the borrowing 
capacity of home-owners and subsequently their consumption and 
investment spending. However, according to this model, the macroeconomic 
impact of this phenomenon is limited as it produces only a relatively 
shallow recession. It is in fact likely that other mechanisms, not covered 
by this model, such as a conﬁ  dence channel and a collapse of trade, 
have played an important role in the ampliﬁ  cation of the ﬁ  nancial crisis.ARTICLES
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2|1|2  The optimal level of credit and the effectiveness 
of macroprudential policy
Anton Korinek (Maryland University) presented a paper co-written with 
Olivier Jeanne (Johns Hopkins University) on the design of economic 
policy to manage credit and asset price cycles. A ﬁ  nancial accelerator 
mechanism is at the heart of their model. A rise in asset prices eases 
private agents’ borrowing constraints, allowing them to spend more and 
thereby fuelling the rise in asset prices further. In the absence of public 
intervention, individual borrowers do not internalise the effects of their 
decisions on prices and so subsequently suffer the effects of exposure 
to cycles of excessive lending. A macroprudential policy should take the 
form of a “Pigouvian” tax on borrowing. Such a tax would prompt issuers 
of debt to internalise this externality and would thus contribute to the 
collective welfare. The model used by the authors is calibrated using 
data for American households and SMEs (small & medium enterprises). 
The optimal tax would be counter-cyclical, dropping to zero at the bottom 
of the cycle and increasing to approximately half a percentage point of the 
amount of debt at the top of the cycle.
In their contribution, Gianluca Benigno (London School of Economics) 
and his co-authors partially question the wisdom of a macroprudential 
policy aimed at preventing the sort of over-borrowing that leads to a 
ﬁ  nancial crisis. First, from a qualitative point of view and somewhat 
counter-intuitively, they demonstrate that the existence of an occasionally 
restrictive credit constraint does not systematically lead to overborrowing 
(vs. an optimal level of debt). Depending on the structure of the economy 
and the values used to calibrate the model, such a constraint may also lead 
to underborrowing. Second, from a quantitative point of view, they ﬁ  nd that 
the gains from an optimal public intervention in terms of welfare are higher 
in times of crisis than in normal times. These two results suggest that the 
implementation of a macroprudential policy in the form of a prudential 
tax on capital ﬂ  ows or of capital controls are of limited effectiveness in this 
class of model compared with ex post public interventions in times of crisis.
2|2  Non-standard monetary policies 
and macroprudential policies
What are the alternatives to and effects of a combined use of monetary 
policy and macroprudential policy? These questions were notably discussed 
in a session dedicated to the macroeconomic impact of non-standard 
monetary policies and the potential challenges and conﬂ  icts relating to the 
simultaneous use of monetary and macroprudential policy instruments.ARTICLES
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Gauti Eggerston (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) presented a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the non-standard monetary 
policies implemented by the US Federal Reserve. One of the central 
issues of the analysis is the switch in monetary policy instruments 
that occurs when the traditional instrument, the policy rate, reaches 
the zero bound and therefore has no further easing potential. In such 
conditions, the central bank can augment its supply of money in 
order to change its relative price by issuing ﬁ  nancial instruments that 
are considered partially substitutable for cash. The study shows the 
substantial effects of these quantitative easing policies on economic 
activity as long as two conditions are met: nominal interest rates must 
effectively be ﬁ  xed at zero, and the economy must show clear signs of 
strong nominal rigidities that prevent an adjustment of supply to the 
level where demand contracted.
The second article of the session, presented by Stefano Neri (Banca 
d’Italia), focused on the interplay between monetary policy and 
macroprudential policy. The authors consider two situations. In the 
ﬁ  rst, the authorities responsible for implementing these policies 
cooperate with each other and coordinate their decisions; in the second, 
they take their decisions independently in a non-cooperative game. 
Their two main conclusions should be stressed. First, in most cases, 
macroprudential policy only has a limited impact on price stability. 
Thus even in the non-cooperative case, monetary policy usually 
manages to achieve its price stability objective. Second, the two policy 
levers are, in effect, complementary in the event of an asset price 
bubble. Their coordination then allows a simultaneous stabilisation of 
the ﬁ  nancial cycle and of price levels.
3|  Should monetary policy react 
to asset price bubbles?
The mechanism underlying the formation of ﬁ  nancial bubbles remains 
obscure. One of the most frequently evoked theories suggests a strong input 
from contagion phenomena. In their contribution, Martin Eichenbaum 
(Northwestern University), Craig Burnside (Duke University) and 
Sergio Rebelo (Northwestern University) present an original model 
of property price formation that captures large upward and downward 
price movements using a somewhat unusual representation of the 
notion of economic contagion. In fact, their approach is inspired by an 
epidemiological model. In this model, “optimistic” agents meet agents 
who are indecisive about the nature of their economic environment and 
“contaminate” the latter with their optimism. These optimistic agents have a ARTICLES
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certain likelihood of subsequently returning to an indecisive state of mind. 
In this framework, expectations about the developments in property prices 
follow a non-linear upward dynamic, followed by a fall. This dynamics of 
expectations is introduced in a model of property market prospection and 
matching. The authors show that the model faithfully reﬂ  ects the dynamics 
of the key variables on the US property market.
Another paper, presented by Olivier Loisel (Banque de France), joint 
with Aude Pommeret (Lausanne University) and Franck Portier 
(Toulouse School of Economics), focused on the role of monetary policy 
when asset price bubbles result from herd behaviour. Entrepreneurs 
may massively adopt a new technology whose productivity is uncertain 
at the time the investments are made (for example, the Internet 
technology in the 1990s). Herd behaviour is due to an “informational 
cascade”: if the ﬁ  rst entrepreneurs receive encouraging private signals 
about the productivity of the new technology and therefore invest 
in this new technology, then all the subsequent entrepreneurs will 
rationally choose to invest in the new technology too, irrespective of 
their own private signal. A tightening of monetary policy that raises 
borrowing costs for entrepreneurs can then prompt them to invest 
in this new technology if and only if they receive an encouraging 
private signal about its productivity. This tightening of monetary 
policy then interrupts entrepreneurs’ herd behaviour, by forcing them 
to act on the basis of their own private information, and therefore 
interrupts the asset price dynamics due to herd behaviour. Such a 
policy can be implemented even when the central bank knows less 
about the productivity of the new technology than each entrepreneur. 
And, in certain cases, because it “insures” the economy against the 
consequences of bad surprises vis-à-vis the actual productivity of the 
new technology, it may be ex ante preferable in terms of social welfare 
to the laisser-faire policy.
4|  The future of monetary policy
What have we learned from the crisis and what are the lessons for 
the future strategy, conduct and implementation of monetary policy? 
To reply to this question, two eminent specialists, Michael Woodford and 
Markus Brunnermeier, put forward their views in two open presentations. 
This was followed by a closing panel that drew up a ﬁ  rst assessment 
and offered some preliminary perspectives on these questions.ARTICLES
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4|1  Should the current monetary policy strategy be amended?
4|1|1  Inﬂ  ation targeting and ﬁ  nancial stability
Michael Woodford (Columbia University) referred to the conclusions of his 
ongoing research with Vasco Cúrdia (Federal Reserve Bank of New York) 
to support the notion that the inﬂ  ation targeting strategy could and should 
be adapted to take into account the possibility of ﬁ  nancial crises. Monetary 
policy should respond to changes in ﬁ  nancial conditions during a crisis. 
For example, key rates should be lowered proportionally to the rise of 
interest rate spreads on markets. This does not imply a change in monetary 
policy objectives (which, in the framework of a ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation targeting 
strategy, are expressed in terms of inﬂ  ation and output gap), but requires 
the use of a forecasting model that takes into account the macroeconomic 
implications of ﬁ  nancial frictions. Moreover, monetary policy has a role 
to play in the prevention of ﬁ  nancial crises, alongside other policies 
that are not totally effective in this respect. The role of these policies 
is not to detect asset price bubbles and to eliminate them, but rather to 
discourage extreme ﬁ  nancial debt phenomena that represent a risk for 
ﬁ  nancial stability. In the case of monetary policy, this ﬁ  nancial stability 
objective may, from time to time, be inconsistent with the price stability 
objective; but such inconsistencies would in fact be very similar to those 
already existing, in the framework of ﬂ  exible inﬂ  ation targeting, between 
stabilising inﬂ  ation and stabilising the output gap. Michael Woodford 
recognised that such a strategy could be considered equivalent to the ECB’s 
“two-pillar” strategy, but he pointed to two major differences. Monetary 
analysis should be used to identify the risks to ﬁ  nancial stability and not 
those to long-term price stability. And it should not be based on an analysis 
of the growth rates of monetary aggregates, but rather on signs of systemic 
risk.
4|1|2  A new role for money
Markus Brunnermeier (Princeton University) proposed a new model 
of a monetary economy that includes ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. In this 
model, households invest their savings in ﬁ  nancial assets provided by 
ﬁ  nancial intermediaries. The latter lend to entrepreneurs with ﬁ  nancial 
frictions. The speciﬁ  city of this new approach is that it is conducted 
in general equilibrium and continuous time, without linearising the 
model around a stationary equilibrium. This approach has precisely 
the advantage of highlighting the ﬁ  nancial instability phenomena, the 
multiple equilibria and the non-linearities that characterize periods of 
crisis. Markus Brunnermeier demonstrates, in the framework of a ﬂ  exible 
price monetary model, the existence of a deﬂ  ationary spiral. A contraction ARTICLES
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in agents’ wealth can lead to a decline in credit and a lower level of 
intermediation, which, in turn, lead to a fall in prices. He then compares 
the properties of this model with those of a standard New-Keynesian model 
to emphasize the advantages of his focus on ﬁ  nancial intermediaries.
4|2  How to combine the monetary stability 
and ﬁ  nancial stability objectives?
The conference ended with a round table on “The future of monetary 
policy”, in which four central bank governors or presidents took part: 
Mario Draghi (Banca d’Italia), Charles Evans (Federal Reserve Bank of 
Chicago), Christian Noyer (Banque de France) and Athanasios Orphanides 
(Central Bank of Cyprus).
Mario Draghi addressed two topics. The ﬁ  rst concerned the non-standard 
monetary policy measures used by the Eurosystem during the crisis. 
Mr Draghi started by stressing the very positive impact of these policies 
on economic activity in the euro area and Italy. Without them, the drop in 
production would have been substantially greater. Mr Draghi went on to 
underscore the high risk inherent to the exit from non-standard monetary 
policies: some fragile banks have become particularly dependent on the 
support provided by the Eurosystem. Consequently, if the problems posed 
by fragile banks were not promptly solved by national authorities, the exit 
from these non-standard policy measures could destabilise such banks 
and engender systemic risk. Mr Draghi made it clear that the national 
authorities should provide assistance to these banks.
The second topic discussed by Mr Draghi was the interplay between 
monetary policy, macroprudential policy and ﬁ  nancial stability. First, 
although Mr Draghi recognises that central banks should monitor a broader 
range of indicators, including credit growth and ﬁ  nancial intermediary 
leverage, he does not believe that this requires a change in the mandate of 
central banks. Lastly, he expressed the view that macroprudential policies 
should allow a greater capacity of loss absorption for the ﬁ  nancial sector. 
This could be made possible by, for example, contingent capital or capital 
adequacy ratios varying over time.
Charles Evans discussed the question of the appropriate monetary policy 
stance for the United States in the current situation, where short-term 
interest rates are close to zero. He began by summarising the economic 
situation in the United States. The unemployment rate is very high and 
there is no sign of any signiﬁ  cant break in the Beveridge curve, suggesting 
that a signiﬁ  cant proportion of the current unemployment is cyclical ARTICLES
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rather than structural. The current economic behaviour of households 
seems to indicate the presence of a liquidity trap. The savings rate is 
increasing and has already exceeded demand for private sector funding 
despite the current low yield on savings. These elements suggest that 
other monetary policy actions may be necessary in the current situation.
Christian Noyer addressed the relationship between ﬁ  nancial stability 
and monetary stability. Historical examples and recent events show 
that price stability is a necessary but not a sufﬁ  cient condition for 
ﬁ  nancial stability. In effect, high and volatile inﬂ  ation generally 
leads to substantial ﬂ  uctuations in asset prices that can destabilise 
ﬁ  nancial markets. Moreover, we have seen the formation of ﬁ  nancial 
imbalances in periods of low inﬂ  ation. At the same time, the authorities 
responsible for monetary stability should be concerned with ﬁ  nancial 
stability because of the impact that ﬁ  nancial crises can have on 
prices. Financial and banking crises usually lead to a fall in demand 
and in inﬂ  ation that can, in extreme cases, lead to deﬂ  ation, with 
enormous costs for the general economy. The second point addressed 
by Mr Noyer concerned the complementarity between monetary and 
macroprudential policies. He began by reminding the audience that 
it is important to establish clear objectives for each of these policies. 
Monetary policy aims to ensure price stability whereas the objective of 
macroprudential policy is to maintain ﬁ  nancial stability. Then, certain 
interactions between these two policies can be identiﬁ  ed. For example, 
macroprudential policy can have an impact on inﬂ  ation via the volume 
of credit. Inversely, monetary policy can raise investors’ risk appetite 
when interest rates are low. Governor Noyer stressed that additional 
research that would improve our understanding of the interaction 
between monetary and macroprudential policies is warranted.
Lastly, Athanasios Orphanides stressed that, to understand the future of 
monetary policy, we should ﬁ  rst look at its recent past. In this domain, 
he emphasised, questions relating to ﬁ  nancial stability have progressively 
disappeared from monetary policy debates. He attributes this state of 
affairs to the limits of the tools of monetary macroeconomics used by 
central banks and by a large part of the academic community. Professional 
economists have insisted on the internal coherence of models and on the 
question of micro-foundations, sometimes at the expense of mechanisms 
that are more difﬁ  cult to model but nevertheless essential for the conduct 
of monetary policy. For example, the question of the link between 
monetary policy and international current account imbalances, which 
are typically left out of the most widely used monetary policy models, is 
crucial. Mr Orphanides therefore invited the academic community and 
central bank economists to address more directly the articulation between 
monetary stability and the determinants of ﬁ  nancial stability.ARTICLES
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At the tail-end of a ﬁ  nancial and economic crisis of a severity unmatched since the 
Great Depression, the quality and diversity of the works presented and discussed 
during this conference reﬂ  ected the dynamism of current research on the topic of the 
future of monetary policy. The conference was therefore an excellent opportunity for 
a fruitful exchange between researchers and economic policy-makers on this topic.
Two main preliminary conclusions can be drawn from the discussions that took place.
Firstly, it is essential to pursue the considerable research effort into understanding the 
complex mechanisms underlying the formation of ﬁ  nancial imbalances and at work 
during ﬁ  nancial crises. This should allow the implementation of the most appropriate 
cyclical and structural economic policies in order to prevent the formation of such 
imbalances and to respond to such crises. In particular, to the extent that these 
mechanisms introduce an externality such as a ﬁ  nancial accelerator or herd behaviour, 
intervention by the public authorities may be justiﬁ  ed even if these authorities do not 
have any informational advantage over the private sector concerning the fundamental 
value of ﬁ  nancial assets.
Secondly, a consensus seems to have emerged in support of the idea that the recent 
economic and ﬁ  nancial crisis does not call for a fundamental change in central bank 
mandates or in the current strategic framework of monetary policy. However, the 
crisis calls for a better integration of considerations about ﬁ  nancial conditions and 
ﬁ  nancial-crisis risks in the implementation of this monetary policy strategy. Moreover, 
central banks will soon have to take into account the potential interactions between 
monetary policy and macroprudential policy in their conduct of monetary policy, both 
in normal times and in periods of crisis. Numerous questions remain as to the best 
way to adapt the conduct of monetary policy to its new environment. This conference 
clariﬁ  ed these questions, even if it did not provide any deﬁ  nitive answers to them.